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MALE CHAUVINISM
denied these same constitutional safeguards."6 7 As each right is consid-
ered by the Court and the juvenile process is said to be indistinguishable
from a criminal trial for the purpose of that right, the methodology of
selective incorporation in the context of the juvenile court system be-
comes increasingly difficult to justify.
CHARLES B. WAYNE
Constitutional Law-The Decline of Male Chauvinism?
The Supreme Court once stated that woman is destined for an
inferior role in the societal scheme of things, that she is properly placed
in a class by herself, and that the law of the Creator deems that she
perform the duties of wife and mother and no other.' In the years
since, the Supreme Court has softened its "romantic paternalism"
toward the "weaker" sex and now views woman essentially as man's
equal.' This evolution has not been without its difficulties, however,
and even the current Supreme Court stance on sex discrimination is
obscure. The principal difficulties seem to be the determination of the
standard3 with which to judge the discrimination in such cases and a
determination of how stringently that standard will be applied.
Stanton v. Stanton4 is the most recent Supreme Court exposition
on sex discrimination and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.5 In an almost unanimous decision6 the Court held that a
Utah statute which fixed the age of majority at eighteen for girls and
67. 387 U.S. at 61 (Black, J., concurring). The same arguments were made by the
dissenters in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. at 557-63.
1. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130 (1872).
2. This evolutionary change is examined in Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971
Term-Foreword. In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Hnv. L. REv. 1 (1972). See also Note, Develop-
ments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAnv. L. Rav. 1065 (1969); Note, Constitu-
tional Law: The Equal Protection Clause and Women's Rights, 19 Loy. L. RaV. 542
(1973); Note, The Decline and Fall of the New Equal Protection: A Polemical
Approach, 58 VA. L. REV. 1489 (1972).
3. See text accompanying notes 14-25 infra.
4. 95 S. Ct. 1373 (1975).
5. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1. This section is the principal vehicle used by
litigants to challenge statutes that allegedly discriminate against females on the basis of
sex.
6. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented.
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at twenty-one for boys could not, under any standard, survive an attack
based on equal protection. On the surface, the treatment of the sex
discrimination issue in Stanton is charaoteristic of recent Supreme Court
holdings involving equal protection; yet, when analyzed, Stanton seems
to be another step forward in toughening the approach of the Court
toward statutory classifications which afford different treatment of the
sexes.
Thelma Stanton, the plaintiff, and her husband James, the defend-
ant, obtained a divorce in Utah in 1960. At that time the court
awarded custody of the two Stanton children7 to plaintiff and, in a
separate agreement, provided that defendant was to pay a certain
sum per month for each child as "child support." Defendant discon-
tinued these payments when his daughter turned eighteen in 1971.
Plaintiff then moved in the divorce court for judgment in her favor
ordering support of the child after she attained the age of eighteen.
The court, under the provisions of the Utah majority statute," con-
cluded that defendant was not obligated to support his daughter beyond
the age of eighteen although he was obligated to support his son until
age twenty-one.
On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, plaintiff argued that the
statute was invidiously discriminatory and denied equal protection of the
laws. The Utah court held that the statute was not unconstitutional,
that the different treatment of men and women was founded on a
reasonable basis, and that some of our ancestors' "old notions" on the
fundamental differences between the sexes were viable today and should
continue to prevail.10 These "old notions" formed the rationale of the
state court's decision and included the beliefs that it is man's primary
responsibility to provide a home, that it is a salutary thing for him to
get a good education before he undertakes those responsibilities, that
girls tend to mature physically, emotionally and mentally at an earlier
age than boys, and that girls generally tend to marry earlier. Thus,
the court concluded that there was "no basis' upon which the majority
7. The two children were Rick who was five and Sherri who was seven. 95 S.
Ct. at 1375.
8. UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-1 (1953). The statute reads: "Period of mitority.-
The period of minority extends in males to the age of twenty-one years and in females
to that of eighteen years; but all minors obtain their majority by marriage." The Court
determined that section 15-2-1, which has little legislative history, was applicable due
to the Utah court's determination that support money is for the benefit of "minor" chil-
dren. 95 S. Ct. at 1375-76.
9. 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010 (1974).
10. Id. at 318-19, 517 P.2d at 1012.
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statute could not be justified and that plaintiff was not entitled to sup-
port money for her eighteen-year-old daughter.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the Reed" test
the Utah majority statute violated the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution. Justice Blackmun explained -that the "old
notions" cited by the Utah court did not justify the different treatment
imposed by the statute. He related:
A child, male or female, is still a child. No longer is the female
destined solely for the home.., and only the male for the market-
place and -the world of ideas. Women's activities and responsibili-
ties are increasing and expanding.... If a specified age of minority
is required for the boy in order to assure him parental support
while he attains his education and -training, so, too, it is for the
girl .... [l]f the female is not supported so long as the male, she
hardly can be expected -to attend school as long as he does, and
bringing her education to an end earlier coincides with the role-
typing society has long imposed. 12
The Supreme Court, therefore, concluded that the age-sex differential
embodied in the Utah majority statute was unconstitutional.'"
Long before Stanton, the Supreme Court's approach to a clas-
sification providing for different treatment of the sexes was to examine
the statute and determine if there was a "rational basis" for the legisla-
tive categorization.' 4 If there was such a basis, the statute was valid.
This approach was the traditional or passive review standard which
was designed and intended to preserve state legislative autonomy with
as little interference from the judiciary as possible. 15
Another test developed to cover other situations in which the
11. See text accompanying notes 29-31 infra.
12. 95 S. Ct. at 1378.
13. The case was remanded to determine whether once the age-sex differential was
eliminated, the appellant was entitled to the support money for Sherri between the ages
of eighteen and twenty-one. The appellant argued that the common law should apply
and that the age of minority should end at twenty-one for both boys and girls. She
cited UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45-1 to -13 (1953) which provide that every man and
woman shall support his child and that "child" means son or daughter under the age
of twenty-one. The appellee urged that the inequality is to be remedied by treating
males as adults at eighteen. This age would correspond with the right to vote and other
privileges of adulthood. In any event, the appellant may have won her lawsuit but it
remains distinctly possible that she will not be entitled to the support money. See 95
S. Ct. at 1379.
14. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872) (where the
fourteenth amendment was initially limited to racial discrimination). The clause was
soon expanded to include any denial of equal protection. See also Bradwell v. Illinois,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
15. See generally Note, 58 VA. L. REv., supra note 2.
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Supreme Court deemed that more than legislative reasonableness was
required to uphold different statutory treatment. Thus, the "strict
scrutiny" test was designed to place the statute into active review and
force upon states the burden of showing a "compelling interest" for
certain classifications that invidiously discriminated. In order for strict
scrutiny to be applied, the discrimination must involve a "fundamental
right," or the classification upon which the discrimination rests must
be "suspect". Accordingly, the Supreme Court has denoted that
religion,'0 associational freedom, 17 work,' 8 voting,'0 procreation,20 and
travel 2' are all fundamental rights while race,22 lineage,23 and alienage 24
are inherently suspect categories. 25
A classification based on sex, however, has never been declared
by a majority of the Supreme Court to be inherently suspeot.21 This
refusal has resulted in application of the passive review standard-a
standard that has not once overturned a sex classification. In fact,
the only bright spot for women's rights in the years between the adoption
of the fourteenth amendment and 1971 was the passage of the nine-
teenth amendment giving women the right to vote.28
Despite this bleak history, in 1971 Reed v. Reed2 ) became the first
Supreme Court case to declare a statute providing for different treat-
ment of the sexes invalid under the equal protection clause. The case
16. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
17. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
18. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
19. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
20. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
21. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
22. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 191-92 (1964).
23. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
24. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948); Truax v.
Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915).
25. The Court has also implied that in certain circumstances poverty and possibly
even wealth are suspect categories. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 17 (1956). But cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973).
26. The closest the Court has come to declaring sex as a suspect classification was
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), where a plurality held that such a cate-
gorization was inherently suspect. See text accompanying note 33 infra.
27. In Stanton the Court held that the statute was invalid under any test but a
Reed standard was applied. 95 S. Ct. at 1377, 1379.
28. For examples of the Supreme Court's treatment of the sex classification dur-
ing these years see Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S.
464 (1948); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130 (1872).
29. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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involved a challenge to a provision of the Idaho probate code which
gave preference to males over females when persons otherwise of the
same entitlement applied for appointment as administrator of a de-
cedent's estate. The Court proposed that this different treatment,
based upon the sex of the applicant, "establishes a classification subject
to scrutiny."30  Although the Court did not say what type of scrutiny
it would employ, the standard of review noticeably differed from the
traditional, passive review standard. Contrary to the test actually ap-
plied, the Reed Court quoted language from prior cases which seemed
to dictate the use of a rational basis test in sex discrimination cases;
nonetheless, the Court seemingly applied a standard that was more
means-focused in that the purposes, rather than the basis, of the statute
were the subjects of the Court's review.31 The consequence was that
the Court had somewhat hesitantly and muddily broken from the
passive review standard.
Frontiero v. Richardson32 followed the Reed breakthrough, with
a plurality of the Court holding that a sex classification was inherently
suspect83 The Court in its opinion noted that Reed gave "implicit
support' for a determination of suspectness and that strict scrutiny in
combination with a Reed analysis of the statutory means or objectives
resulted in the statute's invalidity. Frontiero then was another positive
step by the Court toward, at the most, a declaration of sex suspectness
or, at the very least, a standard of review that involved more than
minimal scrutiny.
30. Id. at 75 (emphasis added).
31. The Reed Court determined that "[a] classification 'must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation. . . ."' Id. at 76, quoting Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (where the Court said it was applying the passive
standard of review). For a discussion of the means-focused approach see Gunther, su-
pra note 2. For a discussion of the various types of tests see Note, Constitutional Law
-Mandatory Maternity Leave Termination and Return Provision of School Boards Vio-
late the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 23 DRAXE L. Rnv. 690
(1974).
32. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (where a statute was invalidated that made it easier for
a serviceman to claim his wife as a dependent than for a servicewoman to claim her
husband similarly).
33. Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and White joined in declaring that sex
was suspect. Justice Stewart concurred but would not declare suspectness stating only
that a sex classification was invidiously discriminatory. This statement left open the
possibility that he may yet be persuaded to hold suspectness. Justices Blackmun, Powell
and Chief Justice Burger seemed to believe that the Equal Rights Amendment would pro-
vide a solution and deferred for the time being any decision of suspectness. Id. at 678,
691-92. The Frontiero decision reversed a court of appeals finding that had rested on
the application of a Reed standard. See Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201 (M.D.
Ala. 1972).
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Although Reed and Frontiero seemed to indicate that the Supreme
Court would no longer tolerate sex discrimination and that the next
step in the evolution would be a majority declaration of suspectness, the
cases between Frontiero and Stanton present a confusing array of
differing applications of the passive and active review standards.84 The
result of this conflict was confusion in the federal courts (as well as in
the Supreme Court itself) over which standard was applicable. Ac-
cordingly, several lower federal courts held during this period that a
sex classification is inherently suspect; 5 others continued to apply a
standard of passive review 6 while still others concluded that the proper
test is somewhere between passive and active review." The Reed-
Frontiero legacy, in any event, appears to be the impetus for future
Supreme Court decisions despite the haziness of the Supreme Court's
approach in other cases of the seventies. 8 Stanton, indeed, seems to
capsulize this legacy.
The trend toward close scrutiny of a sex classification is evident
in Stanton. Although the Court purports to apply a Reed standard,
the test actually used is tighter than the standard in Reed and, in
evolutionary terms, is nearer to a close scrutiny-suspect category type of
review. 9 There are several reasons for this conclusion.
34. Compare Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (where a discriminatory tax
scheme was upheld) and Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (where the dissenting
justice points out that the majority is retreating from the strict review required by Reed
and Frontiero) with Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975) (where the
Court applied a Frontiero standard and upheld a lower federal court's decision that used
a strict scrutiny approach).
35. Johnson v. Hodges, 372 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Ky. 1974); Wiesenfeld v. Secre-
tary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975); Stem v. Massachusetts Indem. and Life Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp.
433 (E.D. Pa. 1973); O'Neill v. Dent, 364 F. Supp. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
36. Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Pendrell
v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Smith v. East Cleveland, 363
F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Healy v. Edwards, 363 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La.
1973); Bowen v. Hackett, 361 F. Supp. 854 (D.R.I. 1973).
37. Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1973); Wark v. Robbins, 458 F.2d
1295 (1st Cir. 1972).
38. As an example of this new impetus, compare Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57
(1961) with Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S. Ct. 692 (1975). See also Justice Marshall's dis-
sent in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 (1970) (where he foresees a stricter
application of the passive review standard-a "balancing test" approach); Note, 58 VA.
L. REv., supra note 2.
39. Note that the Stanton case and a sex classification, in general, meet the defini-
tion of "suspectness" conveyed in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973): "[tjhe class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected
to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of




First, according to Reed, an application of an intermediate, means-
focused approach involves an analysis of the majority statute's purpose,
which must have a fair and substantial relation to the different treatment
the statute provides for eighteen-year-old girls and for eighteen-year-old
boys. 40 However, instead of focusing upon the purpose of the Utah
majority statute-that purpose being the grant of adult status to
eighteen-year-old girls while at the same time postponing the majority
age grant to boys until they reach the age of twenty-one-the Court
looks solely to the legislative reasoning behind the majority statute's
purpose.41 This approach is characteristic of active review, which com-
pels the state to proffer an extraordinary reason or interest to justify
its different treatment of the sexes. Indeed, in the Stanton case, if the
Court had strictly adhered to the Reed balancing test,42 they would
have found a fair and substantial relationship; in fact, the "old notions"
summarily dismissed by the Court do have credence even today.43
The Supreme Court, moreover, placed great importance on the
fact that the majority statute itself provided that marriage terminated
minority. 44 Notwithstanding the fact that if minors of any age or of
either sex get married there is a greater need for them to succeed to the
rights of adults and that that need should supersede the corresponding
rights of other minors, the Court neglected to examine this purpose of
the provision. It instead focused upon the state's interest in having
such a statement in a majority statute and impliedly found that the
state's reason for including it, together with the "old notions," were
not compelling.
40. In Reed the object of the probate statute was the administrative convenience
in simplifying the determination of executors of estates. 404 U.S. at 76.
41. The state interests referred to are the "old notions" proffered originally by the
Utah Supreme Court. 30 Utah 2d at 319, 517 P.2d at 1012. Such "old notions" under
a rational basis test have in the past been upheld by the courts. See Bradwell v. Illinois,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872); Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010
(1974). Also, since the purpose of the statute is not compared with the legislative ob-
ject, the Reed test has not been adhered to. Moreover, the "old notions" do have sub-
stantial relation to the purpose of the statute. See 1974 UTAH L. REV. 144, 165-66. Thus,
the Court apparently treats these "old notions" as "interests" of the state in enacting
the statute. The review is correspondingly tighter and more demanding than the previ-
ous sex discrimination standards.
42. The different treatment of the sexes is balanced against the purpose of having
girls become adults before boys. 95 S. Ct. at 1377-78.
43. For instance, statistics show that girls, on the average, do mature physically,
emotionally, and mentally at a faster pace than boys and that at ages eighteen to nine-
teen girls are much more likely to be married than boys. See, e.g., E. HURLOCK, CHMD
DEVELOPMENT 104-05 (5th ed. 1972); U.S. DEP'T OF COMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF U.S. 1973 at 38; TANNER, Genetics of Human Growth, in 3 HUMAN GROWTH
54-55 (J. Tanner ed. 1960).
44. UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-1 (1953).
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Another important court decision has dealt with a situation similar
to Stanton in which "old notions" were offered as a state interest and
in which a Reed standard perplexingly would not produce the desired
result of invalidating the statute. 45  In Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby" the
court found that the reasoning behind the sex differential-the "old
notions"-would not survive a close scrutiny although a Reed test or
passive review would result in upholding the statute. That court
determined that the sex classification presented for review was inherently
suspect and felt compelled to disregard the notions of what is "proper"
for a person of either sex.47 Reed was thus rejected as a standard in
a manner akin to the Stanton Court's renunciation of the Utah sex dif-
ferential.
The seemingly tighter approach indicates that the Court is seeking
in Stanton to clarify the confusing Reed test.48 In doing so, the Supreme
Court has developed a review that is stricter than Reed in that it focuses
upon the intent of the legislature to the neglect of the purpose of the
statute. It is thus a more demanding approach-placing the burden
upon the state to explain that it has substantial reasons for promulgat-
ing such a statute.
A second reason for the conclusion that Stanton epitomizes the
Supreme Court's trend toward close scrutiny of sex categories is the
manner in which the Court reached the sex discrimination issue.
Stanton appears to be the first sex discrimination case in which the
constitutionality of a statute is considered "in the context" of another
statute.49 This "context' approach varies from the usual equal protec-
tion attack where the statute itself is the focus of the alleged discrimina-
tion. For example, Reed, Frontiero, and other key cases are all con-
cerned with a statute which itself has victimized the party, and it is al-
ways the victimized party who claims discrimination. In this regard,
45. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (where court declared
invalid a statute regulating the use of females as bartenders). But cf. Goesaert v.
Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
46. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
47. Id. at 5, 9, 485 P.2d at 533, 537, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 333, 337.
48. In Reed the language of the test is a paraphrase of the passive review standard
applied in Royster Guano; the case also cites as authority McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961) (where the Court applied a "close scrutiny" review because of the
fundamental right involved-the first amendment-and related, id. at 425, that the test
applied is that the unequal treatment have a "[slubstantial and rational relation to the
object of the legislation"). Therefore, when Reed is seen in the light of the Royster
Guano and McGowan opinions, one must wonder what Reed really stands for.
49. The Court states that "§ 15-2-1 in the context of child support does not survive
an equal protection attack." 95 S. Ct. at 1379 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 54
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Stanton portrays a situation where the victimized party, the Stanton's
daughter, is not a litigant nor is she entiled to the support money.50
For that reason, the Court determined that the majority statute must
be visualized in light of other statutes for it to be found discriminatory
to the appellant. In other words, the majority statute alone is not un-
constitutional but in the context of the statutory provisions for child sup-
port it is. Thus, the Court has taken its sex classification analysis one
step further, not only by allowing one who has not been victimized di-
rectly by the statute to challenge its validity, but also, for the first time,
by invalidating a statute that would not necessarily be of itself unconsti-
tutional but, when applied in conjunction with other statutes, denies
equal protection of the laws.
Furthermore, the Court reached this conclusion on shaky statutory
grounds. The majority statute comes into play solely on the basis of a
1946 case which describes support money "as compensation to a spouse
for the support of minor children."51 However, in 1957, Utah enacted
the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act which specifically provides
that the parent shall support his children and that a "child" is a son or
daughter under twenty-one years of age. 52 The Court did not fully
discuss whether the 1957 Act is perhaps controlling and thus makes the
majority statutory issue moot.5 3 On the contrary, it is plainly evident
that the Court wished to decide the sex discrimination issue despite the
initial difficulties of standing and in the statute itself and despite avail-
able statutory alternatives for disposing of the case. This procedure is
indicative of the Supreme Court's willingness to carefully scrutinize
statutes that result in different treatment based on sex.
54
50. For a Utah case holding that the right to support money belongs to the parent
and not the child, see Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Utah 2d 224, 228, 300 P.2d 596, 598 (1956).
51. Anderson v. Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 306, 172 P.2d 132, 135 (1946).
52. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45-1 to -13 (1957).
53. Justice Rehnquist in his dissent felt that the Court should not be passing on
this issue. He proposed that the proper jurisdiction was in the Utah Supreme Court
where the intention of the parties first needed examination and if the term (the age
when support would cease) could not be supplied from the intent, the question was one
of interpretation of Utah statutory law. Only if section 15-2-1 were deemed the control-
ling statute, rather than the child support sections, and Utah upheld its constitutionality
could the Supreme Court hear the case. 95 S. Ct. at 1380-81.
54. See Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-1974, 49
N.Y.U.L. Rv. 617 (1974). For a discussion of the interventionism of the Burger Court
and the possibility that the character of the statute and the resulting discrimination may
emotively persuade the Court to strictly scrutinize and declare invalidity rather than the
situation where if the statute is not outrageous the party attacking it would be given a
stern lecture on state legislative autonomy, see Gunther, supra note 2; Note, 58 VA. L.
Rnv., supra note 2.
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Finally, the Supreme Court, by invalidating the Utah majority
statute, has implied that a sex classification that unfairly discriminates
against either sex will not be upheld. Such a rule is contrary to the
holding in the recent case of Kahn v. Shevin 5 In Kahn a Florida
statute which permitted a tax deduction to widows but denied the same
deduction to widowers was upheld on the theory that the statute was
designed to eliminate past discrimination against women. Thus, in
reverse discrimination cases the Court appeared hesitant to invalidate a
statute which, on its face, was a denial of equal protection."
Stanton also involves reverse discrimination. While the underlying
purpose of a majority statute is the determination of the age at which
the law will no longer protect minors, the prevailing understanding of
the result of such a statute is that, at the prescribed age, the minor be-
comes an adult and receives the rights and privileges which go along
with adult status. Thus, Sherri Stanton, at eighteen, was free to make
her own contracts, marry without parental consent, sue in court in her
own name, serve as administratrix of a decedent's estate or as executrix
of a decedent's will, and enjoy all other rights granted and reserved to
adults which under the statute could not be enjoyed by boys under
twenty-one. Therefore, Sherri had the best of two possible worlds-not
only was she legally an adult capable of making her own decisions, but
also, under Utah law, was still entitled to parental support until she
was twenty-one. The Court noted this effect57 but nevertheless held the
statute invalid despite the precedent of Kahn. s Hence, the reverse dis-
crimination aspects, the statutory hurdles which could have prevented
adjudication, and the tighter use of the Reed standard all point to a
new and tougher Supreme Court stance on the issue of sex discrimina-
tion.
The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that the Supreme
Court has taken a hesitant step toward a strict scrutiny standard of
review in sex discrimination cases. The extension of the Reed standard
and the cursory manner in which the Court struck down the majority
statute are indicative of an evolutionary process of deciding sex discrimi-
nation cases. However, the current stance of the Court on this issue
55. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
56. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam); Note, Constitu-
tional Law-Tax Exemption for Widows Upheld over Sex Discrimination Challenge,
53 N.C.L. Rnv. 551 (1975).
57. 95 S. Ct. at 1379.
58. An example of a case examining the reverse discrimination aspects involved
in a majority statute is Jacobson v. Lenhart, 30 Il1. 2d 225, 195 N.E.2d 638 (1964).
106 [Vol. 54
MALE CHAUVINISM
remains extremely obscure in view of the conflicting precedent and
the various standards that have been employed to test a statutory sex
classification. This hit-or-miss approach is exasperating not only to
lower courts which must apply some standard but also to the victimized
litigants. If the Court intends to await the Equal Rights Amendmente9
and is simply stalling for time, as the Frontiero justices suggested, such
action is questionable and certainly contrary to the principles of Mar-
bury v. Madison6" which uphold the belief that judicial thought will
not be inhibited by tangentially related acts in the political arena.
Indeed, the Court should declare sex classifications inherently suspect
if only to clear up the confusion and variance which has resulted from
its rulings.
Stanton is a step in this direction and should have a substantial
effect on laws which make an age-sex differential. 61 It impliedly calls
for an end to the "wholly chauvinistic' attitude that has possessed the
Court for so many years. Indeed, -the time appears ripe for the death
of discrimination based on sex. This development would be welcome
and would prevent us male chauvinists from speaking with pride the
puritanical words of Justice Brewer who once said that ".... history
discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent upon man.
He established his control at the outset . . . and this control . . . has
continued to the present. . .. [L]ooking at [the situation] from the
viewpoint of [woman's] effort to maintain an independent position
in life, she is not upon an equality."
62
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59. For a discussion of the Equal Rights Amendment see Brown, Emerson, Falk
& Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights
for Women, 80 YAL L.. 871 (1971); Johnston, supra note 54.
60. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
61. Other courts have dealt with similar Stanton age-sex differentials in statutes.
See Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972) (statute permitted juvenile court juris-
diction until age sixteen); Petty v. Petty, 252 Ark. 1032, 482 S.W.2d 119 (1972) (ma-
jority statute differential); Harrigfeld v. District Ct. of 7th Jud. Dist., 95 Idaho 540,
511 P.2d 822 (1973) (majority statute differential); Jacobson v. Lenhart, 30 Ill. 2d 225,
195 N.E.2d 638 (1964) (statute applied the two year statute of limitations to males af-
ter they reach twenty-one and to females after eighteen); Commonwealth v. Butler, 328
A.2d 851 (Pa. 1974) (criminal statute provided that women receive no minimum sen-
tences while men have set minimums). In North Carolina there may be a question of
Stanton's effect upon automobile liability insurance rates. Boys under twenty-five are
placed in a higher risk category than girls of the same age.
62. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1908).
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